The paper argues that the IBM statistical approach to machine translation has done rather better after a few years than many sceptics believed it could. However, it is neither as novel as its proponents suggest nor is it making claims as clear and simple as they would have us believe. The performance of the purely statistical system (and we discuss what that phrase could mean) has not equaled the performance of SYSTRAN. More importantly, the system is now being shifted to a hybrid that incorporates much of the linguistic information that it was initially claimed by IBM would not be needed for MT. Hence, one might infer that its own proponents do not believe "pure" statistics sufficient for MT of a usable quality. In addition to real limits on the statistical method, there are also strong economic limits imposed by their methodology of data gathering. However, the paper concludes that the IBM group have done the field a great service in pushing these methods far further than before, and by reminding everyone of the virtues of empiricism in the field and the need for large scale gathering of data.
History
Like connectionism, statistically-based machine translation is a theory one was brought up to believe had been firmly locked away in the attic, but here it is back in the living room. Unlike connectionism, it carries no psychological baggage, in that it seeks to explain nothing and cannot be attacked on grounds of its small scale as connectionist work has been. On the contrary that is how it attacks the rest of us.
It is well known that Western Languages are 50% redundant. Experiment shows that if an average person guesses the successive words in a completely unknown sentence he has to be told only half of them. Experiment shows that this also applies to guessing the successive word-ideas in a foreign language. How can this fact be used in machine translation? (King, 1956 ).
Alas, that early article told us little by way of an answer and contained virtually no experiments or empirical work. Like ffiM's approach it was essentially a continuation of the idea underlying Weaver's original memorandum on MT: that foreign languages were a code to be cracked. I display the quotation as a curiosity, to show that the idea itself is not new and was well known to those who laid the foundations of modem representational linguistics and AI. I personally never believed Chomsky's arguments in 1957 against other theories than his own any more than I did what he was for: his attacks on statistical and behaviorist methods (as on every thing else, like phrase structure grammars) were always in terms of their failure to give explanations, and I will make no use of such arguments here, noting as I say that how much I resent ffiM's use of "linguist" to describe everyone and anyone they are against. There is a great difference between linguistic theory in Chomsky's sense, as motivated entirely by the need to explain, and theories, whether linguistic/ AI or whatever, as the basis of procedural, application-engineering-orientated accounts of language. The latter stress testability, procedures, coverage, recovery from error, non-standard language, metaphor, textual context, and the interface to general knowledge structures.
Like many in NLP and AI, I was brought up to oppose linguistic methods on exactly the grounds ffiM do: their practitioners were uninterested in performance and success at MT in particular. Indeed, the ffiM work to be described here has something in common with Chomsky's views, which formed the post-1957 definition of "linguist". It is clear from Chomsky's description of statistical and Skinnerian methods that he was not at all opposed to relevance/pragmatics/semantics-free methods-he advocated them in factit was only that, for Chomsky, the statistical methods advocated at the time were too simple a method to do what he wanted to do with transformational grammars. More recent developments in finite state (as in phrase structure) grammars have shown that Chomsky was simply wrong about the empirical coverage of simple mechanisms.
In the same vein he dismissed statistical theories of language on the ground that sentence pairs like:
the. I saw a triangular whole.
are equally unlikely but utterly different in that only the first is ungrammatical. It will be clear that the ffiM approach discussed here is not in the least attacked by such an observation.
Is the debate about empiricism? No.
Anyone working in MT, by whatever method, must care about success, in so far as that is what defines the task. Given that, the published basis of the debate between rationalism and empiricism in MT is silly: we are all empiricists and, to a similar degree, we are all rationalists, in that we prefer certain methodologies to others and will lapse back to others only when our empiricism forces us to. That applies to both sides in this debate, a point I shall return to.
An important note before continuing: when I refer to ffiM machine translation I mean only the systems referred to at the end by Brown et al. ffiM as a whole supports many approaches to MT, including McCord's (1989) prolog-based symbolic approach, as well as symbolic systems in Germany and Japan.
